What did ya learn in school today?

You know the feeling that strikes you when you stub your toe on the same doorway third time in a row?

In Robert McNamara´s book "In Retrospect" (1995) he defines 11 lessons learned from the VietNam war. Their relevance to contemporary political toe-stubbing hasn´t been overlooked by various bloggers and editors. And admittedly it is hard to read the words, written in '95, without giving the ongoing campaign in Iraq some thought.

The stateman's reflections are somewhat in thread with the Weinberger doctrine - that tries to dictate certainty and clarity in mission when applying Amercan force.

1. We misjudged then -- as we have since -- the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries ... and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.

2. We viewed the people and leaders of the target country in terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for--and a determination to fight for -- freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people... to fight and die for their beliefs and values -- and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.

4. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.

5. We failed then -- as we have since -- to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology equipment, forces and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements. We failed as well to adapt our military forces to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.

6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale U.S. military involvement ... before we initiated the action.

7. After the action got underway and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. We had not prepared the public to understand the complex events we faced and how to react constructively to the need for changes in course as the nation confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment. A nation's deepest strength lies not in military prowess but, rather, in the unity of its people. We failed to maintain it.

8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Where our own security is not directly at stake, our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.

9. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action -- other than in response to direct threats to our own security -- should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions ... at times, we may have to live an imperfect, untidy world.

11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues.