Ho Chi Laden

The good people at Stratfor pulls another interesting analysis. But this time it is especially interesting because it is essentially rhetorical. By analysing Bin Laden's latest speech and comparing it with the strategy of the North Vietnamese they show how Bin Laden is building up a rhetorical deposit that can be cashed in the future. By offering truce he provides a rationale for the anti-war movement in the US (both left and right) to aim for negotiations if (when) the situation gets unbearable in the future. Thus he establishes rhetorical structures that can be activated in the future. Very much what i suggested in my essay on Bin Laden, may I add.

Bin Laden then pulls a maneuver right out of Ho Chi Minh's playbook, saying:

"We don't mind offering you a long-term truce on fair conditions that we adhere to. We are a nation that God has forbidden to lie and cheat. So both sides can enjoy security and stability under this truce so we can build Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been destroyed in this war. There is no shame in this solution, which prevents the wasting of billions of dollars that have gone to those with influence and merchants of war in America who have supported Bush's election campaign with billions of dollars -- which lets us understand the insistence by Bush and his gang to carry on with war. If you are sincere in your desire for peace and security, we have answered you."

If there is a massive anti-war movement in the United States and if the Army is weary of war, then the next logical move is to offer negotiations toward a cease-fire. Bin Laden completely understands that Bush would reject that offer. His hope is that the offer of a truce would further split the United States -- undermining Bush's political power even more and giving ammunition to those who want an end to the war. "If you are sincere in your desire for peace and security," he says, "we have answered you."

During the Vietnam war, the North Vietnamese introduced the idea of a negotiated settlement in large part because they wanted to provide a rational basis for the anti-war movement. They understood that there would be only a tiny pro-Hanoi movement in the United States. They also understood that as the war dragged on and victory became less visible, support would grow for a negotiated settlement as the only reasonable outcome. The view of the pro-war faction -- that the offers of peace talks did not provide any basis for a real settlement but were a cover for a North Vietnamese victory -- was opposed by those who argued that settlement and withdrawal were the only rational actions for the United States in an unwinnable war.

I think that Stratfor is a bit unrealistic about the real possibility for the anti-war movement to call for negotiations. Since it simply isn't a state-actor it would be a bit odd to even suggest it. However they have agood eye for the strategic implications.

What is most clever in this move is that it doesn't require actual negotiations. If Bush starts to draw down forces in Iraq, bin Laden can declare a truce and imply in the Muslim world that he compelled the United States to capitulate. He is trying to trap Bush in two ways. If there isn't a drawdown, Bush would face an anti-war movement calling for truce with al Qaeda. And if there is a drawdown, Bush would face assertions that he is implicitly or secretly agreeing to the truce that bin Laden proposed.